We revisit the link between bailouts and bank risk taking. The expectation of government support to failing banks creates moral hazard-increases bank risk taking. However, when a bank's success depends on both its effort and the overall stability of the banking system, a government's commitment to shield banks from contagion may increase their incentives to invest prudently and so reduce bank risk taking. This systemic insurance effect will be relatively more important when bailout rents are low and the risk of contagion (upon a bank failure) is high. The optimal policy may then be not to try to avoid bailouts, but to make them "effective": associated with lower rents. JEL Classification Numbers: G01, G21, G28
In the recent crisis, governments in several countries provided massive support to distressed …nancial institutions (directly through exceptional liquidity and capital support, and indirectly through unprecedented …scal and monetary expansions). The literature accepts that such support was essential to prevent a …nancial sector meltdown, which would have had devastating e¤ects on the real economy. However it is also forceful in pointing out that, in the long run, government support to banks carries signi…cant moral hazard costs. When banks expect to be supported in a crisis, they take more risk, because shareholders, managers, and other stakeholders believe they can shift negative risk realizations to the taxpayer. So the expectations of support increase the probability of bank failures that governments want to avoid in the …rst place (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Diamond and Rajan, 2009; Farhi and Tirole, 2012) . This paper highlights that when there are risks beyond the control of individual banks, such as the risk of contagion, the expectation of government support, while creating moral hazard, also entails a virtuous "systemic insurance" e¤ect on bank risk taking. The reason is that bailouts protect banks against contagion, removing an exogenous source of risk, and this may increase bank incentives to monitor loans. The interaction between the moral hazard and systemic insurance e¤ects of expected bailouts is the focus of this paper.
The risk of contagion is one of the reasons that makes banks special. While a car company going bankrupt is an opportunity for its competitors, a bank going bankrupt is a potential threat to the industry, especially when the failing bank is large. Banks are exposed to each other directly through the interbank market, and indirectly through the real economy and …nancial markets. While banks have some control over direct exposures, the indirect links are largely beyond an individual bank's control. The threat of contagion a¤ects bank incentives. The key mechanism that we consider in this paper is that when a bank can fail due to exogenous circumstances, it does not invest as much to protect itself from idiosyncratic risk. Indeed, would you watch your cholesterol intake while eating on a plane that is likely to crash? Or save money for retirement when living in a war zone?
Moreover, making the threat of contagion endogenous to the risk choices of all banks generates a strategic complementarity that ampli…es initial results: banks take more risk when other banks take more risk, because risk taking of other banks increases the threat of contagion. 1 Under these circumstances, when the government commits to stem the systemic e¤ects of bank failure, it has two e¤ects on bank incentives. The …rst is the classical moral hazard e¤ect described in much of the literature. The second is a systemic insurance e¤ect that increases banks'incentives to monitor loans (this is similar to the e¤ect identi…ed for macro shocks by Cordella and Levy-Yeyati, 2003 , and to that of IMF lending to sovereigns in Corsetti et al., 2006) . The promise of bailout removes a risk outside the control of a bank and increases its return to monitoring. Going back to our risky ‡ight parable, how would your choice of meal change if you had a parachute?
Formally, we develop a model of …nancial intermediation where banks use deposits (or debt) and their own capital to fund a portfolio of risky loans. The bank portfolio is subject to two sources of risk. The …rst is idiosyncratic and under the control of the bank. Think about this risk as dependent on the quality of a bank's borrowers, which the bank can control through costly monitoring or screening. The second source of risk is contagion. Think about this, for example, as a form of macro risk. When a bank of systemic importance fails, it has negative e¤ects on the real economy, possibly triggering a recession. A deep enough recession can lead even the best borrowers into trouble and, as a consequence, can cause the failure of other banks independently of the quality of their own portfolio. The risk of contagion is exogenous to individual banks (it cannot be managed or diversi…ed), but it is endogenous to the …nancial system as a whole, since it depends on risk taking by all banks.
These two sources of risk are associated to two ine¢ ciencies. First, banks are protected by limited liability and informational asymmetries prevent investors from pricing risk at the margin.
As a result, in equilibrium banks will take excessive idiosyncratic risk. As in other models, this problem can be ameliorated through capital requirements. The second ine¢ ciency stems from externalities. When individual banks do not take into account the e¤ect of their risk taking on other banks, they take too much risk relative to the coordinated solution. And since banks are also a¤ected by the externality, this exogenous source of risk reduces the private return to portfolio monitoring/screening. Bank increase idiosyncratic risk, increasing also the contagion externality. take excessive risk when exposed to risk externalities.
Against this background, government intervention in support of failing banks has two opposite e¤ects on incentives. It exacerbates the moral hazard problem stemming from limited liability, but reduces the externality problem associated with contagion. The extent of moral hazard depends on the rents that the government leaves to bailed out banks, while the importance of the "systemic insurance" e¤ect depends on the probability of contagion. Thus, there are parameter values -low bailout rents and a high risk of contagion -for which the promise of government intervention leads to lower bank risk and better ex ante outcomes.
The "systemic insurance"e¤ects continue to be present when we allow banks to correlate their investments. The threat of contagion may induce banks to excessively correlate their portfolios, because contagion discourages strategies that pay o¤ when other banks fail (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007) . Such correlation may be undesirable for a number of reasons -ine¢ cient distribution of credit in the economy, lower bank pro…ts, or an increased probability of simultaneous bank failures (which are socially costly; Acharya, 2009 ). We show that the expectations of government support may reduce banks'incentives to correlate their investments by decreasing the risk of contagion.
It is important to interpret our results with caution. First, they should not be seen as downplaying the moral hazard implications of bailouts. Rather, we argue that such implications have to be balanced with systemic insurance e¤ects. Systemic insurance may be important for some, but not all parameter values. The best illustration for the case where systemic insurance e¤ects might dominate would be a …nancial system on the brink of the crisis (with weak banks and high probability of contagion) with well-designed bank resolution rules (which minimize bailout rents).
Second, we focus on ex ante e¤ects of policies. Ex post considerations may be di¤erent and depend e.g. on the di¤erence between the economic costs of bank bankruptcy and that of the use of public funds. Third, and most critically, we assume that the government is able to commit to a given bailout strategy. In a richer model with potential time inconsistencies in the government reaction function, outcomes may be more complex. In particular, banks may …nd it optimal to take correlated risks if they believe that bailouts will be more likely when many of them fail simultaneously (Farhi and Tirole, 2012) . We discuss this later.
Several recent papers have explored the e¤ects of expected government support on bank risk taking (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007 and 2008a; Diamond and Rajan, 2009; Farhi and Tirole, 2012) . In these papers, bailouts increase risk taking and generate a strategic complementarity among banks when the probability of bailouts increases with the share of the banking system that is in distress. We add to that literature by introducing a risk externality in the form of an The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses stylized facts on contagion and bailouts, which we use as a foundation for our analysis. Section 3 presents the model of bank risk taking and bailouts. Section 4 extends the model to the case of correlated risks. Section 5 concludes.
Stylized Facts on Contagion and Bailouts
The model relies on two key assumptions. One is that an individual bank cannot fully manage or diversify the risk of being a¤ected by contagion. The other is that government support shields healthy banks from contagion, but leaves rents to failing ones. In this section, we discuss these assumptions in the context of the existing literature. The …nal channel is …re sales by distressed banks, which lower asset prices and a¤ect balance sheet constraints of other banks, pushing them to sell at a loss too. Fire sales can a¤ect asset markets (Lorenzoni, 2008; Korinek, 2011) or, in the form of freezes, bank funding markets (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2003; Diamond and Rajan, 2005) .
Note that it is impossible for an individual bank, operating in a modern banking system, to fully protect itself from contagion. This feature is most immediate for macro contagion. But the same holds to some extent for counterparty risks. First, a bank always needs to maintain some counterparty exposures (e.g. interbank deposits which support the payments system and allow banks to manage liquidity), and these exposures may have to be with certain banks (major "money center" banks). Second, even if a bank cuts its own exposure to a risky counterparty, it cannot be sure that its idiosyncratically safe counterparties have done the same (Acemoglu et al., 2012;
Caballero and Simsec, 2013). 3 Similarly, while some …re sale risks can be reduced, others cannot, e.g. exposures to wholesale funding markets for banks that face a shortage of deposits.
Consistent with this view, we focus on the component of contagion risk that banks cannot manage or diversify (we call it simply, contagion risk). In the model, the risk of contagion results from two factors. The …rst is endogenous individual bank risk taking. The second is the probability of contagion given a bank's failure. In practice, this conditional probability is determined by the stage of the business cycle, the average strength of the banking system, or the overall design of the …nancial system -all of which are of interest but outside of an individual bank's control. Accordingly, given the focus of this paper and to keep the model tractable, we model the probability of contagion given a bank's failure as an exogenous parameter.
Bailout rents. We use the term "bailout" to describe any government support to distressed banks. In practice, such support is often direct: capital or liquidity injections, and (partial) takeovers by the government. During the 2008 crisis, however, support also came through "macro" measures, such as exceptionally accommodating …scal and monetary policies (Laeven and Valencia, 2010) .
Most often, government support leaves "bailout rents" to the incumbent shareholders (and other stakeholders) of distressed banks. When the government lacks legal tools to take over a bank of force it to issue new shares, incumbent shareholders retain claims on future bank income.
This future income would have been zero if the bank had failed, the bailout makes it positive, so shareholders bene…t from a bailout. Bailout rents generate moral hazard: they protect shareholders from downside risk realizations, and hence increase their risk taking incentives. 4 The size of bailout rents is a¤ected by the design of the intervention. For example, a strong resolution framework can help contain bailout rents (e.g. in the U.S. for banks resolved under the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, where, as a rule, most shareholder value is wiped out). In contrast, macro measures may leave banks larger bailout rents than direct interventions. The size of bailout rents is another key parameter of our model.
A Model of Bank Risk Taking and Bailouts
Consider two identical risk-neutral and pro…t-maximizing banks. Each bank i has a loan portfolio of size 1. The portfolio is …nanced by equity, k i ; and deposits (or debt), 1 k i . The gross interest rate on deposits is r D and, for simplicity, not risk-sensitive thanks to deposit insurance. 5 Loan portfolios are exposed to two sources of risk. The …rst is idiosyncratic risk. The portfolio of bank i returns R with probability q i and zero otherwise, where q i is the bank's choice of monitoring e¤ort, which entails a cost 1 2 cq 2 i . We assume that c > (R (1 k i ) r D ) > 0; this ensures that the model has an internal solution. For now, we assume that idiosyncratic risks are uncorrelated across banks (we discuss the case where banks can correlate their portfolio risks in Section 4).
The second source of risk -and the key feature of the model -is contagion. We assume that when one bank fails, there is a probability that (absent government intervention) the other bank's portfolio will also become non-performing, independently of the other bank's monitoring. The risk of contagion cannot be managed or diversi…ed (see Section 2).
Banks choose their monitoring e¤ort simultaneously and cannot observe each other's choices.
The game tree is shown in Figure 1 .
Contagion and Risk Taking
We start by deriving the Nash equilibrium of bank monitoring choices and showing that the risk of contagion reduces bank monitoring. We can write the expected pro…ts of bank i as:
On the right hand side, q i (1 (1 q j )) is the probability that the bank's portfolio will be performing: q i is the probability of the portfolio's idiosyncratic success, which can be reduced by the probability (1 q j ) of contagion. Also there, (R (1 k i ) r D ) is the payo¤ to shareholders in case of success, and cq 2 i =2 is the cost of e¤ort.
From the …rst order conditions of (1) with respect to q i , we obtain the reaction function:
And, imposing symmetry on (2), we obtain the symmetric Nash equilibrium:
From (3) it is immediate to see that the model entails two sources of ine¢ ciency. The …rst, represented by the term (1 k)r D , is classical moral hazard. Banks are protected by limited liability and their risk taking cannot be priced at the margin. Being levered, they will tend to take on too much risk relative to what is socially optimal. The second ine¢ ciency (the focus of this paper) is the externality associated with contagion, represented by . The undiversi…able risk of contagion reduces a bank's incentives to monitor its loans. Both sources of ine¢ ciency lead to excessive risk taking by banks.
More formally, we can state the following result:
The equilibrium monitoring e¤ ort of banks b q is decreasing in the probability of contagion given failure, : db q=d < 0, and increasing in banks' capital: db q=dk > 0
In particular, b q = 0 for = 1 (maximum contagion risk), and b q = 1 c (R r D (1 k)) for = 0 (no contagion risk). The externality associated with contagion lowers a bank's incentives to reduce its own idiosyncratic risk. This is because the risk of contagion reduces the payo¤ to monitoring:
relative to the no-contagion case, for a given monitoring e¤ort, the probability that a bank i receives the positive payo¤ (R r D (1 k i )) is reduced by (1 q j ): The bank then adjusts its monitoring e¤ort to equalize its marginal cost to a lower expected marginal revenue.
The risk of contagion (in equilibrium, (1 b q)) is exogenous to each bank but endogenous to the …nancial system. As a result, in equilibrium, the banking system will bear an ine¢ ciently high level of risk. This stems from two di¤erent, but connected e¤ects. First, a bank does not internalize the positive e¤ect that its monitoring has on another bank's expected pro…ts, leading to a too low level of monitoring (as for any classic externality). The second e¤ect stems from strategic interaction.
As the private return to monitoring depends positively on the other bank monitoring e¤ort, each bank reduces its monitoring e¤ort further than if it were the only one facing the externality. 
E¤ects of Bailouts
Now consider the case when the government can support failing banks. Formally, assume that the government intervenes in a failing bank with probability . The value of is known in advance. 6 A government intervention has two e¤ects. First, it prevents contagion: allows the other bank to survive intact and realize the full value of its pro…ts. Second, it leaves some "bailout rents" to the failing bank (absence of bailout rents would reinforce our results). We model bailout rents by assuming that the bank gets to keep a share < 1 of the pro…ts it could have made if it were idiosyncratically successful. 7 A lower represents a better ability by the government to make intervention targeted (i.e. not bene…tting shareholders of failing banks). The game tree with government intervention is shown in Figure 2 .
Under these assumptions the expected pro…ts of bank i become:
Equation (4) has two extra elements relative to the case without intervention (equation (1)).
First, the probability of contagion falls from (1 q j ) to (1 q j ) (1 ) , because with probability bank j is bailed out. Second, also with probability ; an intervention preserves a share of pro…ts when bank i itself would have idiosyncratically failed without government intervention.
From the …rst order conditions of (4) with respect to q i we obtain the reaction function:
From (5) it is immediate that: 6 The fact that can take values between 0 and 1 captures the notion that the government's exact reaction function may not be public knowledge, or more likely that it is not certain that, even in the case of intervention, default and contagion can be avoided. 7 Note that here we assume that government needs to intervene before observing whether a failure is actually contagious. Under a "more e¢ cient"bailout policy of only intervening after contagion is observed were available, our results would still hold. Moreover, such policy would reduce moral hazard and tilt the balance more in favor of the "insurance" e¤ect.
That is, for a given monitoring e¤ort by bank j; the change in the probability of bailout a¤ects bank i's monitoring through two channels. The …rst channel (the …rst term in the numerator) is the positive e¤ect of systemic insurance: bailouts reduce the threat of contagion, increasing the bank's incentives to monitor. This e¤ect is stronger when the threat of contagion, (1 q j ), is greater (that is when the probability of contagion given failure is larger and/or when bank j is perceived as riskier). The second channel (the second term in the numerator) is the classical moral hazard e¤ect. The expectation of retaining a share of pro…ts in case of failure and bailout reduces the bank's incentives to monitor its loan portfolio. This e¤ect is stronger when the bailout rents are larger (higher ). Imposing symmetry on (5), we obtain the Nash equilibrium:
We can now state the following proposition: Proposition 1 is the key result of our paper. It establishes the "systemic insurance" e¤ect of bailouts. In states of the world where the probability of contagion given failure is high, while the rents associated with government support are low, insuring the banking system against contagion can increase monitoring incentives. This result stems from the two countervailing e¤ects described above. A higher probability of bailout increases moral hazard since it leaves rents on the table for failing banks. But, at the same time, it corrects for the externality stemming from the threat of contagion, protecting banks from a risk that they cannot control. When the threat of contagion given failure is high, while the rents left to a failing bank are small, the second, "systemic insurance" e¤ect prevails.
The Role of Bank Capital
We have showed that government intervention may, under certain conditions, reduce excess bank risk taking that arises due to contagion. It is important to observe that this type of excess risk taking cannot be reduced simply through higher bank capital (which would have been a more traditional policy). The reason is that this risk taking is driven not by leverage but by an externality across banks which bank capital does not directly a¤ect. Indeed, the level of monitoring where banks internalize the contagion externality is obtained by maximizing (1) with respect to q i = q j jointly (assuming symmetrical k i ):
It is easy to see that q > b q for any k.
Moreover, the externality-driven excess risk taking in fact increases under higher capital:
The intuition is that banks with higher capital are idiosyncratically safer (prefer higher monitoring) and so are more averse to an exogenous source of risk. Contagion is more costly for the shareholders of well-capitalized banks.
This does not mean that in this model capital does not serve a purpose. On the contrary, the existence of risk externalities reinforces the rationale for capital regulation to reduce moral hazard. In addition to the traditional "skin-in-the-game" e¤ect on individual bank's risk taking, an increase in a bank capital will also improve incentives at other banks by reducing the risk of contagion. Indeed, it is easy to show that db q i dk j > 0.
The Case with Distressed Banks
As discussed above, the risk of contagion introduces a strategic complementarity in risk taking:
when a bank believes that other banks are taking great risks, it has incentives to do the same. This magni…es the systemic consequences of allowing distressed banks to continue to operate. Distressed institutions have incentives to gamble for resurrection. In this model, this translated into lower q:
For instance, assume bank j has su¤ered losses that have depleted its capital. From equation (5), it is immediate that a lower k j leads to a lower q j : Alternatively, one could think about a shock that has decreased the pro…tability of the bank's portfolio in case of success (a lower R), with similar results. From equation (5), it is immediate that the presence of such "zombie" banks reduces screening incentives for healthy ones. Essentially, distressed banks impose negative externalities ax-ante: by taking greater risks they increase the threat of contagion and reduce the returns to monitoring of otherwise healthy banks, pushing them to take more risk too.
These are exactly the circumstances under which the promise of a bailout is more likely to improve screening incentives (at healthy banks). From equation (6), we know that @ b q i @ is more likely to be positive when the risk of contagion, (1 q j ) ; is greater. And this is the case when q j is smaller, for example because k j and/or R j are smaller.
A Model with Correlated Risks
The previous section showed that bailouts may improve bank incentives by protecting them from a source of risk outside their control. In this section we study how the risk of contagion and expectations of a government bailout a¤ect bank incentives to correlate credit risk.
Consider a slightly modi…ed version of our model. Assume that there are two sectors in the economy. Each bank can lend to only one sector. And the two banks can coordinate on lending to the same or di¤erent sectors. When banks lend to di¤erent sectors the model is identical to that in the previous section: idiosyncratic risk realizations are independently distributed, and banks are exposed to an undiversi…able contagion risk. When banks lend to the same sector, their idiosyncratic risks are correlated. Formally, when banks choose the same e¤ort, q i = q j , they succeed or fail simultaneously. (In our model, q i = q j always holds in equilibrium, because we focus on symmetric banks.) And when, out of equilibrium, banks choose di¤erent e¤ort, for example, q i > q j , bank i's portfolio performs in all states of the world in which bank j's portfolio does. This makes the conditional probability(i is successfuljj is successful) = 1 for q i q j and = q i =q j for q i < q j .
Note that when banks succeed or fail simultaneously, they are not subject to the risk of contagion. Indeed, contagion has a meaningful e¤ect on bank pro…ts only when one banks succeeds while another fails (so that the distress of a failing bank is passed through to an otherwise sound bank). But when banks succeed or fail simultaneously, contagion is irrelevant. 8 When banks lend to the same sector, competition for the same pool of loan opportunities reduces their return in case of success by a measure H. 9 Banks move in a sequential fashion with regard to their choice of sectors. (This ensures that there are no coordination failures; the results are the same when banks move simultaneously but can coordinate using cheap talk.) Banks lend to di¤erent sectors when indi¤erent. After choosing sectors, banks choose monitoring e¤orts simultaneously as in the main model.
Contagion and Correlated Risks
As usual, we solve the game by backward induction. Denote the bank's payo¤ in case of success
. Assume without loss of generality that bank j chooses the sector …rst.
Consider the maximization problem for bank i. If it chooses to lend to a sector di¤erent from bank j, it will remain exposed to contagion and equations are identical to those in the previous section.
The pro…t function (identical to (1)) is:
the e¤ort in the Nash equilibrium (identical to (3)) is:
and equilibrium pro…ts when bank investment strategies are uncorrelated (obtained by substituting (10) into (11)) are:
If, instead, bank i lends to the same sector as bank j, the pro…t function for q i q j (this includes the case q i = q j , which we will show to hold in equilibrium) becomes:
Note two di¤erences with (10) . First, there is no term (1 q j ) in the probability of success:
when banks lend to the same sector, they succeed or fail together, so there is no risk of contagion.
This increases incentives to correlate bank risks. Second, there is an additional term H in the payo¤ in case of success, re ‡ecting a more di¢ cult lending environment when banks focus on the same sector. This reduces incentives to correlate risks.
For q i > q j , the pro…t function is:
Lemma 2 Under (13) and (14), the game admits a continuum of symmetric Nash equilibria in bank monitoring e¤ ort:
Of these, the equilibrium with the highest b q is Pareto-dominant and can be implemented by cheap talk.
Proof. In Appendix A.
In what follows, we focus on the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium of bank monitoring e¤ort:
This obtains pro…ts when bank investment strategies are correlated:
In equilibrium, banks lend to di¤erent sectors for H H , and to the same sector for H <H. Note that @H=@ > 0: the externality stemming from contagion makes correlated investment strategies -lending to the same sector -more attractive.
When contagion risks are severe, banks herd in their choice of assets (in our model, the choice of sector that they lend to) and are willing to accept lower margins in case of success which, in turn, leads to greater risk taking. Note that this …ts nicely with experience of credit booms, such as for instance the subprime mortgage boom that preceded the recent crisis. (Beyond the scope of this model, as a larger share of the banking system invests in a certain class of assets, contagion risk increases. Then, other banks have higher incentives to shift their portfolios to the same class of assets. This leads directly to further risk tasking and increases the impact of the eventual bust.)
E¤ects of Bailouts
Now consider the case when, similarly to the main model, the government commits to support any failing bank with probability .
When banks lend to di¤erent sectors, the model is again identical to that in the previous section.
The pro…t function (identical to (4)) is:
and the e¤ort in the Nash equilibrium (identical to (7) ) is:
Substituting (18) into (19) obtains equilibrium pro…ts:
and for q i > q j is:
Similar to Lemma 1, one can show that the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium of bank monitoring e¤ort is:
Note that since there is no contagion risk when banks lend to the same sector, the promise of a bailout has an unequivocally detrimental e¤ect on monitoring.
The equilibrium pro…ts are:
The bank i is indi¤erent between the two sectors for E( b U j ) = E( b C j ):
which gives the thresholdH: In equilibrium, banks lend to di¤erent sectors for H H , and to the same sector for H <H.
We can now study howH is a¤ected by a change in . The following proposition summarizes: Proof. In Appendix B.
Proposition 2 is our second main result. It shows that whenever a government intervention has a positive impact on bank risk taking, it also reduces banks'incentives to correlate their risks by lending to the same sector.
Note that Proposition 2 o¤ers a su¢ cient condition, but not a necessary one (i.e., the range of parameter values for which bailouts reduce the correlation of bank risks can be wider). The intuition is as follows. Abstracting from the e¤ects of bailouts on e¤ort -holding q exogenous -makes dH ( ) =d > 0 hold always. When q is endogenous, bailouts a¤ect e¤ort. Recall that bailouts always reduce e¤ort when banks correlate their risk. When bailouts increase e¤ort in the uncorrelated sector ( > ), this makes the uncorrelated sector more attractive, so dH ( ) =d > 0 again holds (this is the Proposition 2). But when bailouts reduce e¤ort in the uncorrelated sector too ( < ), and that e¤ect is substantial ( is high), dH ( ) =d > 0 may not hold.
The results in this section rely on the implicit assumption that any announced bailout policy is credible. In practice, governments may have a greater incentive to intervene when several banks fail at the same time (Farhi and Tirole, 2012) . Our model is too stylized to examine this type of time inconsistency (one would need to model explicitly the reaction function of the authorities, including the cost of intervention). Yet, in reduced form, this would imply that the bailout expectations are higher when banks are in the correlated sector. If this e¤ect is strong enough, and bailout rents are su¢ ciently high, government intervention may only have the e¤ect of increasing bank incentives to correlate risks.
Conclusions
This paper revisits the link between bailouts and bank risk taking. It is accepted that bailouts have a moral hazard e¤ect that encourages risk taking. However we also show that when there are risk externalities across banks, this e¤ect coexists with an opposite one: bailouts protect prudent banks against contagion. This encourages monitoring and reduces bank risk taking. On net, a government's commitment to save systemic banks when the threat of contagion is high may reduce risk taking by all banks even when bailouts leave banks some (modest) rents.
The model is open to extensions and interpretations. One could rewrite the model in the context of banks'short-termist behavior that was prevalent in the run-up to the recent crisis. Indeed, the concept of "insu¢ cient monitoring" can be interpreted as business practices that generate shortterm return at expense of higher long-term risk: fee-and volume-based banking, lending with teaser rates, or the use of cheaper but unstable short-term funding. Our analysis shows that banks will have more incentives to engage in short-termist strategies when they are exposed to contagion risk that a¤ects their long-term returns, especially if other banks are also engaging in such strategies.
The model can also be rewritten to study spillovers in international contagion. For example, it would suggest that countries with debt overhang have low incentives to implement macroeconomic adjustment programs if they are subject to contagion from other countries with similar problems.
A joint approach to such countries would be preferable.
The model approaches the issue of contagion in a reduced-form fashion. Future work could explore how the structure of the banking sytem a¤ects the probability of contagious failures in the context of endogenous risk taking. For instance, what is the relationship between bank concentration or competition and risk taking and the risk of contagion? How does this a¤ect the relationship between bailout policies and risk taking incentives? We leave these question for future research.
The results in our paper o¤er policy implications relevant to the current bank resolution and crisis management debates. In particular, the results caution that the recent initiatives that create impediments to timely and targeted intervention may in e¤ect destabilize …nancial system. First, they would make the …nancial system more unstable in the run-up to and during crises, when banks would respond to the risk of contagion by neglecting monitoring and/or by correlating risk with unstable banks. Second, reducing scope for timely, targeted interventions may leave governments with no ex-post options but to undertake more macro, less targeted bailouts, which leave greater rents to failing banks and hence are more distortive. The model suggests that a more promising policy direction is to focus on the e¢ ciency of interventions: creating a legal and practical conditions where interventions in distressed banks can be undertaken easily but "e¤ectively": leaving bank shareholders (and other stakeholders) as little rents as possible.
We intend to show that under (13) and (14), the game admits a continuum of symmetric equilibria:
For q j = b q 2 B Proof of Proposition 2.
De…ne:
Then:
Substitute (20) and (24) into (26) to obtain:
which immediately yields:
Note that all multipliers are positive, except (c V ) (c V ). Recall that we consider > c c (1 )(R (1 k)r D ) . Rewrite the term as:
So all terms are positive: @Z @ > 0; making d e 
